Abstract: Civil conflicts are conceptualized as asymmetric, population centric military struggles. The argument is that insurgencies, even though they are no match in military power to their state adversaries in many cases, resort to armed struggle nonetheless as a tool to impair state capacity, the quality of governance, and the ability of the state to honour the "social contract" in order to eventually destroy state authority and render the state irrelevant for the society. Note that this argument implies that state-society relations do react to the military course of the conflict. In this article, we provide empirical evidence for this implication. Introducing a new panel dataset on the long running civil conflict in Turkey we first conduct a micro-level analysis and demonstrate the significant impact rebel presence has upon state-society relations across localities and time. We then analyze the results of semistructured interviews we had conducted with a group of experts 1 from the conflict regions to decipher the possible mechanisms behind the association we observe in the data. The interviews support our motivating theoretical argument.
enemy. In other words, it is the level of military control combatant sides have that determines both the level of popular support they enjoy and the extent of civilian victimization they chose to engage in.
Kalyvas and Kocher 8 analyze micro-level data from the Vietnam War and provide empirical evidence of the deterministic association between military control and civilian victimization. They then argue that the mechanism behind their findings is the deterministic association between military control and popular support.
Those who have military control can offer protection to civilians and in exchange civilians offer support in the form of valuable strategic information. Kilcullen 9 strongly supports these arguments, and based on his experiences on the field he comes to the conclusion that "populations don't support insurgents because they like their ideology. Rather, they come to like the insurgent's ideology, because the insurgent establishes presence in their area". Similar arguments about the link between military control and popular support have been employed in other works in the literature as well 10 .
Note that in all these works violence is narrowly defined as civilian victimization and popular support is conceptualized as either attitudinal, logistic or informational support or as active recruitment into combatants.
Moreover, even though most of them employ the argument about the existence of a deterministic association between military control and civilian support 11 , none of them actually empirically test it. Rather they remain at offering some anecdotal evidence.
In this study, we address this empirical gap by analyzing the long running civil conflict in Turkey and its impact on state-society relations with a multi-method approach which combines micro-level statistical analyses with expert interviews.
In the quantitative part of our analyses, we conduct a set of micro-level statistical analysis with new panel data on the long-running civil conflict in Turkey and demonstrate that military control, which, following
Kilcullen's arguments we measure with military presence, is indeed significantly associated with state-society relations. We adopt a conceptualization of popular support that goes beyond immediate attitudinal or behavioral changes driven by survival and security concerns to capture the strength and well-being of the statesociety bond. More specifically, we show that in the Turkish case the number of state security force casualties is associated with the number of different types of personal dispute cases filed by citizens at state courts across time and locations. We argue that the number of security force casualties constitutes a good measure of the level of rebel presence in the area. Similarly, for reasons we present in the next section, we argue that whether citizens bring their personal disputes to state courts or not is a good measure of the strength of the state-society bond and citizens' acknowledgement of the state as the sole authority to provide order and justice. The results of the statistical analyses reveal a significant negative association between our measures. To account for the possibility that state-society relations might in turn impact upon military control, in other words, to address the possibility of reverse causation which results from the likelihood that rebels might more easily establish control in areas where the state-society bond is weak, we redo our analyses employing an instrumental variable approach. Results remain consistent.
Finally, in the qualitative part of our analyses, we analyze the results of semi-structured interviews we had conducted with a group of experienced lawyers from the conflict regions to see whether our quantitative results are supported by qualitative evidence and to decipher the possible mechanisms behind the association we observe in the data. The interviews also support our motivating theoretical argument and thus significantly increase our confidence in the robustness of our findings.
In the next section, we build our theoretical framework. Then in section 3 we introduce the Turkish case. In section 4, we construct our statistical model and present our data. Section 5 discusses the results of the first set of statistical analyses. Section 6 presents the results of the instrumental variable analyses. In section 7, we present and discuss the results of the semi structured interviews we conducted. Finally, section 8 concludes.
POPULAR SUPPORT, LEGITIMACY and ADJUDICATION
Easton 12 refers to popular support as one of the major inputs which furnish a political system with the energy to keep it going. He argues that "no political system can continue to operate unless its members are willing to support the existence of a group that seeks to settle differences or promote decisions…Supportive states of mind are vital inputs for the operation and maintenance of a political system". Note that his understanding of popular support is based on recognition of authority to make decisions and settle disputes. Forrest 13 echoes Easton's arguments and sees the loss of popular support for the state as a process of "state inversion" whereby "the state grows increasingly irrelevant for society… culminating at its most severe levels in the disintegration of the central government."
"State inversion" as defined by Forrest neatly summarizes the ultimate goal of insurgencies. Insurgents attack the legitimacy and control of the state while attempting to develop their own credibility and authority with the population. That the goal of an insurgency is to accomplish a transfer of legitimacy has been acknowledged and emphasized by practitioners as well. The US Amy and Marine Corps Field Manual on Insurgencies 14 starts with defining insurgencies as "organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control." Kilcullen 15 explains how this transfer of legitimacy takes place: "…if an armed actor establishes presence and establishes rules that are predictable and consistent, then the population will be reassured, and feel safe, and flock to them. So, the insurgents are basically trying to create a legal system…a rule of law is the same thing that the insurgents are trying to establish". Supporting Kilcullen's views Mampilly 16 argues that establishment of a force to police the population followed by a broader judicial mechanism to regulate disputes are often the first steps taken by any rebel group because "a system of law provides a degree of stability to a rebel controlled territory allowing civilians to normalise their life under rebel rule." In other words, insurgents seek to erode state authority and eventually drive the state out by establishing military presence and providing civilians with security and order.
The thing to note in all this discussion is the importance assigned to the establishment of a legal order which should not come as a surprise considering that the triad-two contracting parties and a dispute resolver-constitutes a primal technique of organizing social authority and, therefore, of governing 17 . Weinstein 18 conceptualizes this as the establishment of a "rebel governance" which can be defined as the establishment of a series of rules and institutions by a rebel group to manage relations with civilians living in the territory under its control and to govern civilian life. Tull 19 sees it as the first stage in the process of state formation.
Indeed, some scholars depict rebel administrations as "embryonic states"
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The first conjecture that follows from these arguments is that in civil conflict environments we should expect to see an erosion of popular support for the state, defined in line with the above discussion as popular recognition of state authority, in areas where insurgents manage to establish military presence. While this conjecture has been taken as a given in several recent studies 21 , to our knowledge, it is yet to be tested Admittedly, it is impossible to observe such a dynamic in countries with weak states that had failed to establish a legal system and accessible judicial institutions in the first place. In such cases, we can only observe the existing political vacuum being filled by the rebels. Afghanistan constitutes a striking example in that respect. Turkey is one of the few cases that fit this description. As we discuss in section 4, it has a well-established judicial system with full penetration into the country, and as such it offers a rare opportunity to study the association between military control and popular support in civil conflicts.
In this study, we devise a measure of popular support for the state based on whether citizens take their personal disputes to state courts to be resolved. We then present a rich panel data set from Turkey that allows us to track down the association our measure has with socioeconomic indicators of interest as well as the temporal and geographic distribution of military control throughout the long running civil conflict in the country.
Kalyvas 26 depicts military control in civil conflicts by distinguishing between zones of incumbent control, zones of insurgent control and zones of contested control. According to his definition, those zones in which state forces are able to move with safety are zones of incumbent control. Where insurgents are able to effectively prevent the operation of state forces we are in a zone of insurgent control. In between there are the zones of contested control. In other words, military control is a continuous scale that varies from no control to full control. And control hinges on military effectiveness which requires "a credible armed presence" 27 . In fact, the requirement of armed presence is so fundamental that Kilcullen 28 uses the terms military presence and military control interchangeably, and directly links popular support to military presence. Based on these conceptualizations we measure state military control with the number of state security force casualties (SFCs) across localities and time. We argue that the number of SFCs provide a good indicator of insurgent presence.
Note that one important point we need to pay attention in conducting our analyses is the possible endogeneity between popular support and military control as one can expect insurgents to be more likely to establish control in areas where state-society relations are weak. That weak states with limited governance capacity create fertile grounds for civil conflicts has already been firmly established by works on the correlates of civil conflict onset 29 . We also know from the recently emerging conflict diffusion literature that insurgencies tend to spread to areas where the rebels have pre-existing ties to the population 30 . Moreover, harsh counterinsurgency tactics employed by state forces can alienate civilians and lead them to grow sympathy for the rebels who may then take advantage of their newly found popular support to establish military presence 31 . In other words, we need to account for the possibility that the direction of causality in the association we observe in the data might not solely be from military control to popular support but might also be from popular support to military control. In order to make sure that our analyses and our conclusions do not suffer from such endogeneity, in Section 6 we redo our statistical analyses by employing an instrumental variable approach. The results reaffirm our theoretical conjecture that an erosion of state legitimacy and popular support takes place in areas where insurgents manage to establish military presence. As can be seen in Chart 1 which depicts the total number of security force and PKK casualties over the years, the 90s has been the most bloody period of the conflict. The PKK received a major blow when its leader The PKK insurgency is a very striking example of the asymmetry inherent in civil conflicts. Here we have an insurgency which had started out as a "handful of outlaws" 37 (Kıbrıs, 2011 ) but managed to stand against the second largest army in the NATO for more than thirty years to become the most important problem facing the Turkish state (Kıbrıs, 2011 The second type of judicial courts is the criminal courts. These courts handle cases which involve the punishment of a crime rather than the resolution of a dispute.
THE TURKISH-KURDISH CIVIL CONFLICT
Because we are interested in whether citizens adhere to the state judiciary the authority to resolve their personal disputes or not, we will be analyzing the cases filed at the civil courts of general jurisdiction, and at the peace courts of civil jurisdiction. We will model the number of court cases filed at these two types of courts respectively, across the 81 provinces in Turkey 38 in the 1985-1999 period, in other words, we will model panel count data. Accordingly, we will be estimating the parameters of the following fixed effects negative binomial regression model:
where Y i,t will be the number of cases filed at the peace courts of civil jurisdiction, and general jurisdiction civil courts respectively, in province i at year t. We obtained the data on court cases from the Turkish Ministry of Justice.
Our independent variable of interest is SFC i,t which is the number of security force (soldiers and police officers) casualties (hereafter referred to as SFC) of the PKK insurgency in province i at year t. We argue that this is a good indicator of the PKK presence in a province. Within the time period we are analyzing there were in total 5040 SFCs. Based on our theoretical argument about the association between military control and popular support, we expect the SFCs to be negatively associated with the number of court cases.
Our second control variable is PKK i,t which is the number of PKK casualties in province i at year t.
Combined with the number of security force casualties this variable allows us to have a more complete understanding of the military course of the conflict across provinces. The data on PKK casualties is from the KIM database by Tezcür 39 .
N i,t is population size in ten thousands in province i at year t. Naturally, we expect population size to be one of the most important determinants of the number court cases in a province.
H i,t is the number of doctors (specialist and practitioner) per hospital bed in province i at year t. Kıbrıs and Metternich 40 demonstrate the damaging impact of the civil conflict in Turkey on the availability of educated personnel in the public health sector. A similar dynamic might be present in the judiciary as well, and we need to account for it. We do not have data on the availability of judges, prosecutors, or lawyers, but we have data on availability of doctors and infrastructure in the public health sector which we argue is a good indicator of the state's ability to provide public services across provinces and time. We obtained the data on doctors and hospital beds from the Turkish Ministry of Health.
G i,t is gross domestic product per capita in million liras at constant prices at province i in year t. Since most disputes are related to property or economic transactions, the level of economic activity in a province should be an important determinant of the number of civil court cases. We obtained the data on GDP per capita at the province level from the Turkish Institute of Statistics.
As a result of the heavy and incessant PKK activities and attacks, a number of provinces were put under a state of emergency in 1987, and most of them remained so all through the 90s. State of emergency brought many restrictions on the daily lives of the residents of these places, and the freedoms they should have normally enjoyed. Moreover, it meant transfer of additional military and security personnel to the area.
Because being under the state of emergency indicates high PKK presence and activity in the first place, and because the disruption of normal daily life, the heightened security measures, the restrictions on social and economic activities and the increased presence of security and military personnel are all expected to impact upon state-society relations, we introduced D i,t in our model which is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if province i was under the state of emergency in year t, and 0 if not.
R i,t is the urbanization rate in province i, in year t. We account for urbanization to control for possible differences in social life in urban and rural settings that might impact upon the number of court cases. Urban life is more organized compared to rural life, and hence one can expect less personal disputes to arise in more urban settings. On the other hand, economic and social life is livelier in urban settings creating more opportunities for disputes related to economic and social transactions. We also expect urban residents to be more informed about and have more access to the state judiciary. Finally, the inclusion of urbanization rate in the model allows us to account for the migratory flows that the conflict led to, especially in the 90s, from rural areas to city centers. A good portion of these flows was the result of village evacuations by state forces as a counterinsurgency measure against the PKK. According to a parliamentary inquiry conducted in 1998, by the end of 1997 more than 378 thousand villagers were forced to leave their homes in the 3428 villages that had been evacuated.
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Finally, P is a set of province dummies that account for unobserved province specific effects, and similarly T is a set of year dummies which we include to control for unobserved year specific effects. u i,t is province-year level error term.
We also estimated a random effects version of our model in which province level unobserved factors are thought of as realized values of random variables. We included in our random effects model a control for the Kurdish population percentages across provinces as well. Both the ethnic nature of the civil conflict, and the fact that Kurdish is not recognized as an official language, which creates a language barrier for ethnically Kurdish citizens in their dealings with state institutions, imply that the ethnic composition of the population might be an important factor in analyzing state-society relations in Turkey. Unfortunately, data on the ethnic composition of the population in Turkey is very limited. Mutlu 42 derives estimates for 1990 at the provincial level. These estimates are actually projections based on the results of the 1965 general census which was the last census that included questions on mother tongue. Those who reported Kurdish as their mother tongue were taken as ethnically Kurdish and the percentages were then updated using fertility rates and migration flows. We use these estimates as our control for the ethnic composition of the population across provinces.
Accordingly, K i is the percentage of ethnically Kurdish population in province i in year 1990. Note that because we only have one observation per province (for 1990) over the years, we are not able to include this variable in the fixed effects model as it becomes perfectly collinear with province fixed effects. In our fixed effects model the ethnic distribution of the population is expected to be captured by province dummies.
Our data spans a 15-year period between 1985 and 1999 enabling us to analyze the period from the very start of the conflict up until the capture of the PKK leader Öcalan, the ceasefire and the cessation of violence that followed. The time span of our analyses is dictated by data availability on socioeconomic indicators. Table 1 below presents the descriptive statistics.
THE FIRST SET OF RESULTS
In this section, we will present the first set of results we get from our negative binomial regression analyses on the number of court cases filed. Table 2 presents the results we obtain with our fixed effects model, and Charts 2 and 3 visualize them. We do not report the estimated parameters for year and province dummies as they take up too much space. Complete results are available upon request.
For ease of reading we report the natural log of estimated parameters which correspond to the incidence rate ratio. Correspondingly, the estimated coefficient for the number of SFCs tells us that an additional SFC in the year leads the number of cases filed at the civil courts of general jurisdiction to drop by about 0.3 percent. As can be seen the number of court cases is negatively and significantly associated with the number of security force casualties as expected. These results are supportive of our argument that the military course of a civil conflict is associated with popular support, and that state-society relations take a serious hit in places where the PKK establishes military presence.
Chart 2 Chart 3
Note that the estimated coefficients are quite substantial as well. In 1994, there were 30 provinces (out of 76) with security force casualties. The mean number of SFCs was 35 and there were 9 provinces with higher numbers. Based on the estimated coefficients, a province with 35 SFCs is expected to have about 10%
less cases filed at civil courts in 1994 compared to similar size provinces away from the conflict zone. This decline corresponds to a 39% drop in Hakkari, a province in southeastern Turkey with 160 SFCs in 1994.
As expected population size is positively associated with the number of court cases filed. Similarly, the level of economic activity, which we measure by GDP per capita, boosts up the workload of courts.
Interestingly, the estimated parameter for urbanization rate turns out to be negative for cases filed at civil courts of general jurisdiction. At first look this is a surprising result since urban areas with their higher population density, and higher volume of economic and social transactions are expected to harbor more personal disputes. Nevertheless, it must be noted that this expectation is conditional upon the ability of the newly urbanized masses to get integrated in the social and economic life of the cities. And as we argued in the previous section this has not been the case in the Turkey. The rapid urbanization of the 90s in Turkey was mostly caused by the civil conflict itself rather than economic development, and those masses who migrated to urban centers were mostly poor, uneducated villagers who were first and foremost concerned about their security and lacked the means to be integrated in the social and economic life of their new surroundings. This, we argue, lies at the heart of the negative association we observe between the rate of urbanization and the number of court cases.
We have examined the predictive performance of our model by conducting two-fold cross-validation tests. We have randomly set aside 20 percent of our observations, and fit the model on the remaining 80 percent. Then we used the observations we had excluded as a test bed to see how accurately our model can predict them. Charts 4 and 5 depict the results. As can be seen we have an exceptionally good fit between the predicted values and the actual observations.
Chart 4 Chart 5
We also present in Table 3 the results we obtain when we resort to a random effects specification. As can be seen the main results remain consistent, and additionally, we observe a substantial and significant negative association between the ethnic Kurdish population percentages across provinces and the number of civil court cases. Because we do not have data on the ethnic identity of those filing the cases we cannot argue that ethnically Kurdish people are more reluctant to deal with the state judiciary. Nonetheless, the ethnic nature of the conflict makes it likely that it is the relations between the ethnically Kurdish populations and the Turkish state that takes the biggest hit in the process. We should also note that this result might also be related to the ban on the usage of Kurdish in official transactions which creates a significant barrier for Kurdish people in their dealings with the state. Note that we are analyzing the cases filed at the civil courts, which means these are cases about personal disputes rather than criminal acts. Consequently, we do not expect them to be related with the crime rate in the society which itself might be associated with the civil conflict environment. Nevertheless, to provide further evidence that crime rate is not an intervening variable, we also collected data on cases filed about specific types of disputes which we can argue for sure that are not related with the crime rate in the first place.
Specifically, we collected data on the number of trespassing cases filed at civil courts of general jurisdiction across provinces for the 1988-1999 period. Trespassing cases are about property disputes that usually come out of failures to respect land borders, and unauthorized use of someone else's real estate property. They are among the most common type of civil court cases especially in rural areas.
In Table 4 we present the results we get when our dependent variable is the number of trespassing cases filed at general jurisdiction civil courts. As can be seen the results do not change much. We still observe the negative association between the number of cases filed and the number of SFCs across provinces and years. Note that our main set of analyses covers the 1985-1999 period and as such does not include preconflict observations. To make sure that the associations we observe are attributable to the conflict rather than some other omitted variable which had been there all along before and throughout the conflict (like cultural differences among regions or discriminatory state practices, etc.) we extend our main regressions on general jurisdiction and peace court cases to the 1975-1999 period. Unfortunately, due to lack of data we lose the urbanization and doctors per hospital bed variables within this extended time period. To partially make up for this reduction of explanatory power in our model we control for the number of doctors across provinces and the urbanization rate for year 1990. The results we obtain from the random effects negative binomial regressions are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. As can be seen the negative association between the number of court cases and SFCs is still significant and substantial which constitutes proof against omitted variable claims.
For further robustness checks we have also run all these regressions after excluding Şırnak and Hakkari, the two provinces with the highest casualties. The results do not change in any significant manner indicating that they are not driven by outliers. Given the substantial and significant association we observe between Kurdish population percentages and the number of civil court cases filed across provinces we also reran our analyses after excluding those provinces where ethnic Kurds constitute the majority to make sure that what we are observing is not specific to "Kurdish towns". The results remain consistent. Finally, we redid our analyses after excluding the provinces outside the conflict zone with no casualties over the entire period we are analyzing. We obtained similar results 43 .
THE PROBLEM OF ENDOGENEITY AND AN IV APPROACH
So far our analyses support the theoretical conjecture that in civil conflict environments an erosion of state legitimacy and popular support takes place in areas where insurgents manage to establish military presence. We now need to explore the other side of the coin and acknowledge that the state's loss of military control not only drives the citizens to withdraw their support from the state but also to shift it towards the insurgent organization. As Kalyvas 44 argues "The obverse of every gain in collaboration that one side experiences with gain in control is the loss of collaboration experienced by the other side along with its loss of control." And popular support means more information, logistic support, manpower, and consequently more military control for the rebel organization. Note that if popular support impacts upon military control, then the security force casualties variable will be correlated with the error term in our original model leading to a serious violation of regression assumptions.
In order to account for this problem we employ an instrumental variable approach. Instrumental variable (IV) methods form a common body of approaches to handling such endogeneity problems. Specifically, we will use the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method. A detailed explanation of the 2SRI method is included in the Appendix.
We will first run the following random effects poisson regressions to estimate the number of SFCs and PKK casualties across provinces and years 45 :
Note that we include the same set of regressors as in our original model plus a vector of instrumental variables.
Of course, the critical point here is to find "good" IVs. We use the number of snowy days, altitude, and the length of paved roads across provinces and years as our instrumental variables for the number of SFCs and PKK casualties. We argue that snowfall is negatively correlated with combatant casualties as PKK is not as well equipped to maneuver in harsh weather conditions as the Turkish military forces. This is why, as Chart 6
demonstrates, PKK attacks usually cease during winter months and restart as the weather gets better. Consequently, we expect less casualties in a province experiencing a long and harsh winter.
On the other hand, we expect the Turkish army (PKK) to be at a relative disadvantage (advantage) at mountainous, high altitude regions due to limited infrastructure and reconnaissance. Thus, altitude is expected to have a positive (negative) association with SFCs (PKK casualties). Finally, we expect the length of paved roads to be positively associated with the mobility and maneuverability of the Turkish army and its capability to engage with the PKK. Thus, we expect this measure to be positively associated with casualties. While it can be argued that snowfall, altitude and lack of paved roads can make transportation harder for civilians as well, and thus, independent of the conflict, can affect the workload of courts, we do not expect to see such associations in the Turkish case first because, as we mentioned above, there are civil courts in every county in Turkey, and second because we are analyzing yearly number of courts filed across provinces rather than seasonal numbers. Nevertheless, to verify the validity of our instrumental variables, we also conducted a placebo test by including them in our original model and tested their association with the number of civil court cases filed in provinces away from the conflict zone. If weather conditions, altitude and elevation impact on the work load of courts only through their impact on the civil conflict then we should see that impact vanishing in provinces away from the conflict zone. Table A .2 in the Appendix reports the results. As can be seen, the results are supportive of the validity of our IVs. The estimated coefficients for snowy days and altitude lack statistical significancy. The estimated coefficient for the length of paved roads is one indicating the lack of any substantial association with the number of court cases. Having verified the validity of our IVs, we then proceed with our two-stage residual inclusion method. where res i,t is the vector of first stage residuals. We run this regression for the number of cases filed at the peace courts, the number of cases filed at civil courts of general jurisdiction, and the number of trespassing cases respectively. The results are reported in Table 6 . As can be seen the number cases filed at civil courts remain substantially and significantly associated with the number of security force casualties. The random effects specification which is presented in Table 7 yields very similar results. 
WHAT IS GOING ON? INTERVIEWS
Our results so far indicate a strong association between the military course of the conflict and the number of court cases filed at civil courts across provinces. Our interpretation of these results is that statesociety relations take a serious hit in places where the state experiences military losses against the PKK.
While this is a plausible interpretation, we nevertheless have to acknowledge that it is not the only possible one, and that there may be observationally equivalent mechanisms behind the association we see in the data. And if so, in order to ensure the validity of our argument, we need to make sure that our model accounts for those alternative mechanisms as well.
To figure out what those alternative, observationally equivalent mechanisms are we conducted semistructured, phone interviews with 16 experienced lawyers from eastern and southeastern provinces that were under the state of emergency in the 90s. We first interviewed the current and/or former presidents of the bar associations of these provinces, then asked our interviewees to direct us towards other experienced lawyers that we could talk to. The interviews were semi-structured in the sense that we posed the same open-ended question to each of our interviewees at the very beginning and allowed them to express their views on their own terms. Below is the narrative that we used in each of the interviews:
"We are working on a research project that analyzes the impact of the armed conflict in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey on state-society relations, and specifically on citizens' approach to state justice. To understand the impact we are looking at whether people have been bringing their personal disputes to state courts or not.
So far, we have statistically analyzed the number of personal dispute cases filed at the peace courts of civil jurisdiction and the general courts of civil jurisdiction across provinces and years in the 80s and 90s, and we have observed that the number of these cases are negatively associated with the losses of the state security forces in a significant and substantial manner. In other words, the number of cases filed at civil courts decline significantly in districts where and at times when state security forces experience high losses against the PKK.
We would like to ask you whether you have actually observed such an association and if so why you think this is happening. Finally, we are wondering whether there are any alternative dispute resolution methods or justice authorities that people resort to instead of taking their disputes to state courts."
The transcripts of the interviews are presented in the Appendix. Interestingly, we heard almost the same things from all the lawyers we interviewed. They all declared that their personal experience confirmed our statistical finding. Five major mechanisms through which the conflict impacts upon the number of court cases emerged from their answers. The numbers in parenthesis are the frequency of mention of these mechanisms across the 16 interviews.
1. (14) When state loses control of the area, people take their cases to those who has it.
2. (13) People lose trust in state justice due to ethnic and regional discrimination, and counterinsurgency tactics. The state labels the locals, and especially ethnic Kurds, as potential terrorists and rebels, and treats them accordingly. Especially in cases of criminal offence against the state, the administrative and criminal courts have been issuing severe and unjustified punishments which created a very negative public perception against state justice. This reflects upon civil courts as well. People do not trust the state judiciary, they do not expect justice from the state. Moreover, counterinsurgency tactics employed by the state really have killed the trust people had for state institutions and officials. People are so distrustful that they try to disappear from the state's radar altogether.
3. (5) Especially for land disputes in rural areas, the armed conflict makes it impossible for court officers to conduct exploratory work without which they cannot decide upon the case. Judges and prosecutors do not stay in their posts for long either. Due to security concerns they move to other posts at the first opportunity they have. For these reasons cases take too long to finalize which discourages people from seeking redress in state courts.
(5)
Conflict dampens economic and social activity and thus people do not have too many disputes to be resolved when the conflict gets intense. It is also costly to seek justice in the state judicial system. There are taxes and fines to be paid. These costs become all the more debilitating when the conflict gets intense and creates economic problems. Note that the first two mechanisms, loss of authority and loss of trust, confirm our hypothesis about the association between military control and state-society relations. Both the results of our statistical analyses and the interviews tell us that as the state's ability to provide security is challenged so is its bond with the society.
The third and the fourth mechanisms are about the indirect impacts of the conflict on the number of court cases through its damaging impacts on economics and infrastructure. Note that our model controls for these indirect effects. While our GDP per capita variable accounts for the indirect impacts of the conflict via its dampening effect on the economy, our control for the number of medical doctors per hospital bed accounts for the indirect impacts via infrastructure.
The fifth mechanism, that is, postponement of the resolution of disputes in times of high conflict intensity, is a bit more tricky because it is about the impact of the conflict on the priorities of people which we are not able to observe. Nonetheless, we are able to control for an observable implication of the change in priorities. As we discussed in previous sections one implication of the rising importance of security concerns has been the migratory flows from rural areas to city centers which are reflected in our control for the urbanization rate across time and provinces. If anyone, it must be those who left, or were forced to leave their villages as a result of security concerns that are most likely to postpone the resolution of any kind of personal disputes they might have had back home. In other words, we expect urbanization rate to act as a proxy for the prioritization of security concerns and to capture the postponement of the resolution of personal disputes. The estimated negative association this variable has with the number of trespassing cases (which are the most common type of cases in rural areas) support our argument. Moreover, the lack of a significant association between the number of court cases filed and PKK casualties confirm our argument that the main mechanism is the loss of popular support for and trust in the state due to state's loss of military control rather than postponement due to conflict intensity. For if it had been the latter then we would have expected the number of PKK casualties to be negatively associated with the number of court cases as well since casualty numbers are indicators of conflict intensity regardless of which side they come from.
As mentioned above we also asked the interviewees about the existence of alternative authorities.
Interestingly, the answers clustered around two alternatives, societal leaders who act as mediators based on customary law, and the PKK. The referral to customary law, and the mediation of personal disputes by societal leaders were emphasized by all our interviewees as the main alternative to state justice. It turns out these leaders do actually have a name as well. They are called the rûspî which means the white-bearded/whitefaced in Kurdish in referral to old age and wisdom. We were told that the resolution of disputes by the rûspî is an age-old practice in southeastern and eastern Turkey and that the conflict and the resulting distrust in the state justice really helped revive this institution. Interestingly, Kilcullen 46 emphasizes the importance of empowering community-based dispute resolution and mediation systems in societies in civil conflict and argues that, because they peacefully resolve disputes and minimize the violence, their empowerment should be a key issue in counterinsurgency efforts.
What is even more interesting and relevant for our study is that 6 of the lawyers we interviewed mentioned the PKK as an alternative authority that people resort to resolve their disputes. This finding is consistent with the claims that appear in Turkish newspapers every once in a while about the "PKK courts" 47 , and it strongly supports the theoretical claim that popular support is endogenous to control 48 . It seems in places where PKK establishes military presence local people not only turn away from state judicial institutions but they also start recognising PKK's authority as the legitimate adjudicator in their disputes. It is also in line Kilcullen's 49 and Mampilly's 50 (2007) observations that the establishment of a legal system is the first step taken by any rebel group.
CONCLUSION
It is widely accepted that popular support is the sine qua non of victory in civil conflicts. Given that success depends on the ability to raise popular support it becomes extremely important to understand its determinants. In this study we provide strong statistical and qualitative evidence for the argument that popular support is endogenous to military control. We define popular support as popular acknowledgement of the state as the sole authority to provide order and justice. We first analyze a new panel data set that we constructed on the long running civil conflict in Turkey and provide empirical evidence that whether citizens recognise the authority of and deal with state judiciary institutions or not is significantly associated with the extent of rebel presence in their locality. To our knowledge, we are the first to present statistical evidence that there exists an association between the military course of a civil conflict and state-society relations. Then we present qualitative evidence we gathered from a set of expert interviews we conducted in the conflict zone. This multi-method approach is an important strength of our study and enables us to credibly demonstrate the robustness of our results.
Our study is innovative in terms of the measure of popular support it employs which we base on the yearly number of different types of personal dispute cases filed by civilians at state courts across provinces.
Our measure is motivated by the common observation among practitioners and scholars that establishment of a legal system is often among the first steps taken by rebel groups. Note that protection against transgressions on life and property, and the authoritative adjudication of disputes that arise from such transgressions constitute the raison d'être for a state. Consequently, citizens' reluctance to employ the state judicial mechanisms to resolve their personal disputes signals an important erosion of state authority and legitimacy.
We base our measure of military control on rebel presence which we measure by state security force casualties. Kalyvas 51 strongly criticizes the usage of fatality counts as a proxy for conflict intensity in civil conflicts. We very much agree with his criticism that measuring conflict intensity by fatality counts risks incorrect identifications since different levels of conflict intensity can be compatible with a given fatality count. Note that our goal is not to measure conflict intensity but rather rebel presence across localities and time. And we use security force casualty counts as our measure rather than civilian fatalities.
Finally, we would like to touch upon another important discussion in the literature to which we think our study contributes. The power asymmetry between the incumbent state and the insurgents is a descriptive feature of civil conflicts. However, descriptive though it may be, the asymmetric nature of these conflicts has a puzzling side to it as well, since from a rationalist point of view, such an asymmetry in power should discourage the rebels and prevent civil conflicts from happening in the first place. While the commonly raised and widely studied explanations like informational asymmetries, commitment problems, and issue indivisibilities provide important insights 52 , our results point to an important shortcoming of these explanations, namely the dynamic nature of civil conflicts and the change that the course of the conflict brings about in actors' perceptions of each other and their cost-benefit calculations 53 . We empirically demonstrate in this study that popular support, which is itself a major source of power and as such heavily shapes cost-benefit calculations, responds to the military course of the conflict. Our results indicate that conceptualising civil conflicts as dynamic bargaining problems rather than static ones is a much better way to understand them.
On a closing note, we must also acknowledge the limitations of our study. Our results are derived from a single case which requires us to be cautious in making generalizations 54 . While focusing on a single case helps us untangle causal dynamics, it also raises concerns about the generalizability of our findings. In our case, one important limitation is the fact that the conflict in Turkey has two well-defined sides whereas many other conflicts have multiple actors. In particular, one may expect those cases with multiple fighting groups to have a more acute process of "state inversion" reaching complete collapse. Moreover, such more complex, multifaceted conflicts might develop additional dynamics that we are not accounting for. 
A.2. The 2-Stage Residual Inclusion Method
This method was first suggested by Hausman 54 in the linear context as a means of testing for endogeneity.
To put it formally, our original model can be thought as follows:
where X e is the vector of endogenous regressors (in our case SFCs and PKK casualties), X o the vector of observable exogenous variables and X u is the vector of unobservable confounder latent variables (omitted variables) that influence the outcome Y and are correlated with X e . If X u were observable then we would simply include them in the model and resolve the problem of endogeneity. Nevertheless, they are not, thus the impact of these unobservable confounders remain as part of the error term and cause it to be correlated with X e.
To formalize the relationship between X e and X u above, and thereby provide a means for dealing with endogeneity bias through the use of instrumental variables (IV), we define the following equation:
where IV is a vector of instrumental variables. The elements of the instrumental variable vector must satisfy three conditions: they cannot be correlated with X u ; they must be sufficiently correlated with X e (i.e., it must not be "weak"); and they can neither have a direct influence on Y nor be correlated with the error term u i,t in the original model in equation (1). Also there must be at least as many elements in IV as there are endogenous regressors in X e . In our case, we have two endogenous variables, SFCs and PKK casualties, hence we need to come up with at least two IVs to estimate the above regression. Note that the error term in equation (2) is (⍵ 3 X u + e), and thus, depending on the strength of the IVs, it will be significantly correlated with X u . That correlation is what we will use to correct the endogeneity problem in our original model. We will use (⍵ 3 X u + e) as our best approximation for the unobserved X u , and include that approximation in our original model as an additional control. 
A.3. IV validity

A. 4. Transcripts of the interviews
1) Female lawyer from Diyarbakır: There is no trust here in the state or its justice. The state has a regional understanding of justice. In criminal courts, offenders get very light punishments in similar cases in, say, Istanbul but very harsh punishments here. There is discrimination. Those caught in Istanbul with 50 kilograms of heroin, for example, are sentenced to just a couple years in prison, whereas if they catch someone with 10 grams here, they put him away for life. People take their personal disputes to societal, tribal leaders, to elders that they trust. I have heard of PKK courts but never personally saw one.
2) Male lawyer from Diyarbakır: The judiciary discriminates based on ethnicity. And ethnicity is defined by region. That is, it is not so much a difference between Turks and Kurds but rather a difference between Diyarbakır and Istanbul. People are not happy with the state's understanding of justice. They take their disputes to whomever is the authority in the area. They do not want to deal with the state, they do not want to be in the state's radar. They are already forced out of their homes, labeled as potential terrorists, The state always punishes. There is no state in the region anymore, it has lost people's trust. and their discriminatory approach reflects upon all courts. People see the judges as the state itself. They resort to traditional methods for dispute resolution. They go to the rusipi (the wise, the whitebearded/faced), they resort to the sharia law and ask the imam to be the judge, they take their disputes to the party or, of course, to the PKK. When things get better people then prefer the state judiciary.
10) Male lawyer from Van: In the 90s people did not resort to the state courts because they feared for their lives. They refrained from filing complaints against the state. They refrained from taking their personal disputes to state courts because especially in rural areas it was impossible for the court officials to conduct exploratory work out in the field, so cases took long and remained unresolved. The feudal structure of the society is still in place. The tribal leaders intervene and resolve disputes.
11) Male lawyer from Van: I would concur that the number of personal dispute cases filed at state courts decline when the fighting gets intense. I have heard quite often that people take their disputes to the guerrilla. People talk and we hear things. I have also heard that the guerrilla has certain enforcement and sanction mechanisms to make sure that people obey by their rulings. This is in fact a crime so no one would admit to such a thing. After the 80s a huge mistrust in state justice has occurred. People say there is no justice in state courts. In rural areas judicial officers were not able to conduct exploratory work for land dispute cases. Some 3500 villages were evacuated, 95-97% of them by the state. The state used force to evacuate those villages, they made people suffer. There was no authority to seek redress for these, it was not possible to sue the state. Some people joined the guerrilla. When the state caught those they were executed on the spot without a trial. This is against the law, such practices damaged the trust in the state justice. Those who were taken into custody were severely punished. Terror crimes are punished heavily everywhere but for other offences the state judiciary has had a regionally discriminating approach. People who had a relative in the PKK were treated very badly even if they themselves had nothing to do with the guerilla. Those suspected of aiding and abating the PKK were sentenced with the heaviest punishments. There has been mistrust towards the Turkish justice for a long time now. Disputes here are resolved by societal, tribal leaders. With the conflict and guerrilla presence this practice doubled.
12) Male lawyer from Van: The inclination of the courts to protect the state against the citizens damaged the trust people have in the judiciary. The judiciary is not independent. The feudal structure of the society is still continuing in this region. Dispute resolution is handled within this structure. I have not witnessed any other authority in that respect. about their future they do not deal with a court case that is expected to take long anyway. They go to societal leaders. Religious leaders also resolve disputes based on sharia law, especially in rural areas. I do not know whether customary law became more common in times of conflict. Immigrants do not have the luxury of going to court. People also were afraid of dealing with the courts because they were maltreated when they did. So they thought they were better away from the state radars.
16) Male lawyer from Hakkari: People resolve their disputes within the societal structures, on the spot. During conflict times court officials were not able to conduct exploratory work in the field. There are cases that have remained unresolved for 20 years because of that.
